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U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  M I C H I G A N  
OURNAL of  LAW REFORM ONLINE 
COMMENT 
PARTY’S OVER: ADMISSIBILITY OF POST-TRIAL JUROR 
TESTIMONY SHOULD DEPEND ON THE NATURE OF THE 
CONDUCT 
Justin Gillett* 
What do you call a weeklong period in which you and a 
handful of acquaintances drink alcohol every day at lunch,1 sleep 
though the afternoons,2 smoke marijuana3 and ingest a couple 
lines of cocaine on occasion?4 You call it the time when a jury 
convicted Anthony Tanner and William Conover of conspiracy to 
defraud the United States and commit various acts of mail fraud.5 
Under a current rule of evidence, which precludes juror testimony 
to impeach a verdict except on extraneous prejudicial 
information, juror intoxication is not an external influence about 
which jurors may testify.6 A new test for the admissibility of post-
trial juror testimony should be adopted so that juror testimony 
regarding jurors’ consumption of drugs and alcohol during breaks 
can be received.7  
                                                   
*  J.D. Candidate, May 2013, University of Michigan Law School. 
1.     Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 136 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
2. Id. at 135.  
3. Id. at 136. 
4. Id.  
5. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 136.  
6. Id. at 125 (citing FED. R. EVID. 606). 
7. Juror testimony admissibility after Tanner has been the subject of several 
scholarly articles, some proposing reform.  See, e.g., Mark A. Corti, Tanner v. United 
States Did the Court Go Too Far in Its Interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 606(B)?, 
3 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC. 49, 57–58 (2001) (proposing judicial determination of 
misconduct in an in camera hearing); Benjamin T. Huebner, Note, Beyond Tanner: An 
Alternative Framework for Postverdict Juror Testimony, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.1469, 1491 (2006) 
(proposing several “practices for addressing juror testimony that would more effectively 
serve the relevant policy interests” of Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)); Jessica L. West, 12 Racist Men: 
Post-Verdict Evidence of Juror Bias, 27 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 165, 170 (2011) 
(proposing mechanisms to reduce the influence of bias during deliberations and allowing 
evidence of biased juror statements where the juror materially misrepresents biases on 
voire dire).  This note proposes that admissibility of juror testimony should turn on one 
principal: its ability to be objectively verified. 
J 
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ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF JUROR MISCONDUCT DEPENDS ON 
THE NATURE OF THE CONDUCT 
In both criminal and civil cases, judges may order a new trial 
if juror misconduct prejudiced the losing party and affected the 
jury’s verdict.8 The admissibility of evidence tending to prove 
misconduct depends on the nature of the conduct involved.9 
Subjective internal matters, such as “the juror’s motives, the effect 
of jury discussions on the juror, and the reasoning processes of the 
juror,” are inadmissible because they are considered to inhere in 
the verdict.10 Conversely, objective external matters, such as overt 
acts, are not considered to inhere in the verdict and are generally 
admissible.11 For example, evidence of inappropriate material 
conveyed to a juror is admissible objective external evidence, but 
testimony about the effect that such evidence had on the juror is 
inadmissible subjective internal matter.12 
In criminal trials, juror intoxication implicates a defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to an unimpaired jury.13 It is “widely 
agreed” that the overt act of drinking intoxicating liquors during 
the course of a trial is improper.14 The resulting state of 
intoxication can impair a juror’s ability to carry out his or her 
responsibility to make a rational judgment based upon the 
evidence presented.15 Therefore, judges should be able to grant a 
new trial when juror intoxication results in prejudice to the losing 
party.16 
POST-TRIAL JUROR TESTIMONY REGARDING DELIBERATIONS IS 
                                                   
8. 24 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts §633 (2010). 
9. Id. 
10. Id. (“[T]hose matters which inhere in the verdict are those which are personal to 
the juror and subjective in nature .… [M]isconduct relating to the motives, beliefs, or other 
mental operations or emotions of a juror are considered subjective matters, or matters 
which inhere in the verdict.…”). 
11. Id. 
12. Id. (citing City of Columbia v. Lentz, 282 S.W.2d 787, 787 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955)). 
13. See U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .…”); Tanner v, United States, 
483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987) (citing McIlwain v. United States, 464 U.S. 972, 976–77 (1983) 
(“[D]ue process may well require the granting of a mistrial whenever a trial judge finds that 
a juror, already engaged in deliberations, is so drunk that the deliberations must be 
recessed.”)). 
14. 24 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts  §633 (2010). 
15. Id. 
16. See id. 
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LIMITED FOR EXPRESS POLICY REASONS 
Though juror intoxication is held to be misconduct, admissible 
sources of evidence to prove such misconduct is limited.  In order 
to promote the justice and finality of jury findings, and to protect 
jurors from harassment and exploitation by unsatisfied litigants,17 
post-trial juror testimony regarding deliberations is limited.18 
Limitations on testimony regarding deliberations are meant to 
promote the “full and free debate” during deliberation that is 
necessary to attain just verdicts.19 The fear is that, without the 
prohibition on post-trial scrutiny of jury deliberations, juror 
discussions would be less frank, and jurors would be less willing to 
return an unpopular, though just, verdict.20 Further, if litigants 
were able to attack jury findings based on jury deliberations, 
many verdicts would be followed by investigations into those 
deliberations in the hopes of finding evidence of juror 
misconduct.21 This would disrupt the finality of juries’ findings of 
fact.22 Such investigations would also invite juror harassment, and 
even exploitation of disgruntled jurors.23 
ADMISSIBILITY OF POST-TRIAL JUROR TESTIMONY DEPENDS ON 
THE SOURCE OF THE CONDUCT 
To prevent the potential issues described above, the Federal 
Rules of Evidence outline the allowable scope of juror testimony 
in an inquiry into the validity of a verdict.24 During such an 
inquiry, juror testimony relating to deliberations, effects on jurors’ 
votes, and jurors’ mental processes is limited to existence of 
prejudicial information, outside influences, and verdict form 
errors.25 
                                                   
17.  See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 124 (citing the U.S. Senate’s finding that inquiries into 
internal jury deliberations “would permit the harassment of former jurors by losing parties 
as well as the possible exploitation of disgruntled or otherwise badly-motivated ex-jurors”).  
18. E.g., id. 
19.  Id. at 124. 
20.  Id. at 120-21. 
21.  Id. at 119-20. 
22.  Id. at 120. 
23.  Id. at 120, 124. 
24.  FED. R. EVID. 606. 
25.  Id. The pertinent text of the rule reads: 
(b) During an Inquiry Into the Validity of a Verdict or Indictment. 
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In Tanner v. United States, the United States Supreme Court 
confirmed that, according to the Rules of Evidence, juror 
testimony that relates to external influences is admissible, and 
that which relates to internal influences is not.26 However, the 
Tanner Court proceeded to exclude post-trial juror testimony 
regarding juror alcohol and drug use during trial as an 
inadmissible internal influence.27 It so held even though the jury 
showed external signs of intoxication.28 
PROPOSED REFORM: ADMISSIBILITY OF JUROR TESTIMONY SHOULD 
TURN ON ITS ABILITY TO BE OBJECTIVELY VERIFIED; OBJECTIVE 
VERIFICATION IS A PROXY FOR INHERENCY 
Admissibility of juror testimony should turn on its ability to be 
objectively verified. Testimony regarding subjective internal 
matters that inhere in the verdict, such as discussions and 
activities during deliberations that betray mental operations of a 
juror,29 are unverifiable. Thus, they should be protected 
inadmissible matters. However, external objectively verifiable 
                                                   
(1) Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence. During an inquiry into the 
validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about any 
statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s 
deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s 
vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or 
indictment. The court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a 
juror’s statement on these matters. 
(2) Exceptions. A juror may testify about whether: 
(A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought 
to the jury’s attention; 
(B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any 
juror; or 
(C) a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict 
form. 
26. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 117 (“The [internal/external] distinction was not based on 
whether the juror was literally inside or outside the jury room when the alleged 
irregularity took place; rather, the distinction was based on the nature of the allegation.”).  
27. Id. at 125 (“[J]uror intoxication is not an ‘outside influence’ about which jurors may 
testify to impeach their verdict.”).  
28.   Id. at 126 (refusing to grant a new trial even if it were true that “several of the 
jurors fell asleep at times during the afternoon”). 
29.  24 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts §633 (2010) (“[T]he essence of the distinction 
[between subjective and objective misconduct] is that misconduct relating to the motives, 
beliefs, or other mental operations or emotions of a juror are considered subjective matters, 
or matters which inhere in the verdict, whereas misconduct relating to extraneous matters, 
overt acts, or external matters are considered objective matters, or matters that do not 
inhere in the verdict.”). 
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matters do not inhere in the verdict.30 Juror testimony regarding 
objectively verifiable conduct that affects the outcome of the 
deliberations can be considered, while still protecting the 
promotion of “full and free” debate necessary to attain just 
verdicts. 
ADMISSIBILITY OF JUROR TESTIMONY THAT TURNS ON 
INHERENCY WOULD OPTIMIZE THE OCCURRENCE OF FAIR RESULTS 
In isolation, both promoting full and free debate and inquiring 
into jury decisions foster fair results. When combined without 
restriction, however, post-trial scrutiny of jury deliberations would 
undercut frank debate and detract from the overall likelihood of 
fair results. The test for admissibility of post-trial judicial 
testimony should strategically permit post-trial juror testimony 
that safeguards a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an 
unimpaired jury31 without unduly discouraging the full and free 
debate necessary to attain just verdicts. 
The complete lack of juror accountability is not necessary for 
full and free deliberations, nor does it best promote the higher 
aim of attaining just verdicts. Verdict accountability for factors 
that affect a jury’s ability to perform its duty would lead to better 
jury function.  Permitting jurors to testify to matters that do not 
inhere to the verdict, such as jurors’ consumption of drugs and 
alcohol during breaks, would provide such accountability. By 
definition, only matters that inhere in the decision can constrain 
full and fair debate.32 Thus, such a test for the admissibility of 
post-trial juror testimony would increase the quality of trial 
outcomes without unduly constraining full and free deliberations. 
An inherency-based test would not unduly affect the finality of 
verdicts nor expose jurors to undue harassment and exploitation. 
The test would only permit a narrow inquiry based on objectively 
verifiable conduct. By definition, matters that do not inhere to the 
verdict, such as overt acts, are objective matters.33 Thus, any post-
verdict inquiry would be strictly limited to adducing evidence that 
is admissible even under the current test. 
                                                   
30. Id.  
31. See U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .…”).  
32.    See supra text accompanying note 10. 
33.    See supra text accompanying note 11. 
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The admissibility test for post-trial judicial testimony should 
turn on the nature of the evidence proffered. Such a test would 
optimize the occurrence of fair results by balancing the promotion 
of “full and free debate” with the ability to inquire strategically 
into the validity of an individual verdict, and would not unduly 
affect the finality of verdicts or expose jurors to undue harassment 
and exploitation. 
